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Case No. 960507-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate 
jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (I) (1953 
as amended). This case and the companion appellate 
jurisdiction were transferred to this Court by the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953 
as amended), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1953 as 
amended) and as provided by letter dated July 31, 1996, from 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 
267) . 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the State of Utah violate Mrs. Basta's rights 
to due process of law and her rights to a fair trial as 
guaranteed in Art. I, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and the 
5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution (A) by failing to disclose exculpatory 
information, (B) by introducing false/perjured testimony and 
(C) by inappropriate prosecutorial argument and misconduct? 
Standard of Review. 
A trial court's determination of whether the State 
violated constitutional rights is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness, and will not be reversed unless 
"clearly erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19 (Utah App. 
1993). However, the trial court's conclusions of law are 
accorded no deference by the reviewing court. State v. 
Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Wilcox, 808 
P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the State of Utah violate Mrs. Basta's 
rights to due process of law and her rights to a fair trial 
as guaranteed in Art. I, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and 
the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution by failing to preserve the crime scene, 
destroying material evidence and unfairly attacking her 
2 
expert witness? 
Standard of Review. 
A trial court's determination of whether a 
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial is 
violated is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness, and will not be reversed unless "'clearly 
erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, (Utah App. 1993). 
However, the trial court's conclusions of law are accorded 
no deference by the reviewing court. State v. Deli, 8 61 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 
1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 
(Utah 1991) . 
3. Whether the cumulative errors in this trial require 
a reversal of Mrs. Basta's convictions. 
Standard of Review. 
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which, 
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, 
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 
957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For 
an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
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the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions are presented for interpretation, and they 
provide: 
Amendment V of the United States Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part: 
nor shall [he] be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; 
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Section 1. . . . [no State shall] deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
[Due Process of Law] No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
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Article I, § 12, of the Utah Constitution provides (in 
pertinent part): 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, . . . to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This case comes to the Utah 
Court of Appeals (poured-over from the supreme court) from 
convictions of Mrs. Basta for Aggravated Arson, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 
(1953 as amended)(See Addendum "A"); and Insurance Fraud, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
521 (1994) (See Addendum "A"), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
The case involved a house fire of the family home of 
Mrs. Basta, her husband and son. The State presented a case 
focusing on financial pressures as motives for an 
intentional fire to gain insurance funds argued to have been 
set by Mrs. Basta. The defense contended the fire was an 
accidental fire and if no arson was committed then likewise 
5 
no insurance fraud. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. Mrs. Basta was charged 
by way of Information with the offenses of Aggravated Arson 
and Insurance Fraud on April 6, 1995. The charges stem 
from the destruction of the family home in Sandy, Utah by 
house fire on February 11, 1995. Following her initial 
appearance before the magistrate, Mrs. Basta was appointed a 
Public Defender. On April 11, 1995, Mark R. Moffat entered 
his appearance and filed a request for discovery. As of 
that date, however, the crime scene had been cleaned up and 
the home actually repaired and remodeled by an interim owner 
who had rented back the home to Mrs. Basta's family. 
The case went to trial over four days, November 14-17, 
1995, resulting in convictions as charged on both counts. 
Subsequent to the verdicts, counsel for Mrs. Basta filed 
motions to arrest judgment and/or a new trial. The trial 
court denied those motions after written memoranda and 
arguments in December of 1995. 
Sentencing proceeded and the court placed Mrs. Basta on 
probation after service of jail time and conditioned on 
payment of restitution of $90,416.81, recoup fee of $500.00, 
and other conditions ordered by the court. (R. 242). She 
continues on probation at the filing of this opening brief. 
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After timely filing the Notice of Appeal, Docketing 
statements and several continuances to file this brief, the 
Legal Defenders Office conflicted out of the case concerning 
potential claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Current counsel was then appointed and prior to the filing 
of the opening brief, filed a 23B motion to remand for a 
hearing regarding the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
This Court partially granted that motion on the 24th day 
of April, 1996, specifically articulating the issues subject 
to the remand. 
The trial court scheduled and held the 23B hearing and 
denied Mrs. Basta's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The denial of those specifically articulated 
issues subject to the remand are NOT subject of this appeal. 
Rather, this appeal is based on the trial and errors 
resulting therefrom and from the trial court's denial of 
Mrs. Basta's claims supporting her motion to arrest judgment 
or for new trial. 
C. Statement of the Facts. Betty Basta resided at the 
address of 916 East Peachblossom Drive in Sandy, Utah, with 
her husband Robert and son Brent. (R. 757). The Bastas had 
lived in the home for over twenty years. On February 11, 
7 
1995, the Bastas' home was destroyed by a fire.(R. 769). 
In the years preceding the fire, the Bastas had endured 
substantial financial hardship. (R. 325, 327). Robert Basta 
had lost a major janitorial account which provided 
supplemental income for the family. Because of the 
reduction in income, the Bastas were unable to make their 
house payments. (R. 667). In 1994, the Bastas were faced 
with the prospect of losing their house. (R. 668). The 
Bastas then entered into a contractual agreement with 
Lakeside Properties and Lyndon Parks whereby Parks would 
purchase the Basta home and thereafter allow the Bastas to 
lease the home with an option to purchase. (R. 310) The 
Bastas were required to make monthly rental payments and 
continue remodeling the basement of the home. (R. 624). The 
Bastas were also required to maintain insurance on the home. 
(R. 632) . 
Betty Basta controlled the family finances. (R. 667-68) 
A dispute developed between Mrs. Basta and Lakeside 
Properties as to the amount of the monthly "lease" payment. 
Mrs. Basta refused to pay the amount requested by Lakeside. 
(R. 624) . Lakeside attempted to evict the Bastas in October 
1994. (R. 624). The Bastas and Lakeside then reached an 
agreement whereby the Bastas were permitted to remain in 
their home. (R. 605). The dispute as to the amount remained 
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unresolved. 
Evidence produced at trial indicated that Mrs. Basta had 
applied for full coverage insurance on February 6, 1995. (R. 
325-27). This application occurred ten days after the Bastas 
allegedly were served with a three-day eviction notice. (R. 
327-28). 
Testimony from Robert and Brent Basta established that 
on February 10, 1995, the day prior to the fire that 
destroyed the home, there was a fire in a storage closet in 
the basement of the Basta home when Mrs. Basta was not at 
home. (R. 760, 769). This fire was extinguished without the 
assistance of the fire department. (R. 765). The storage 
closet was located under the stairwell. (R. 760, 764, 675, 
798). Prosecution witnesses placed the area of origin on 
the floor of the basement family room directly in front of a 
common wall shared with the stairwell closet. (R. 339, 346). 
The fire grew hot enough to melt the insulation on 
electrical wires running through the common wall. (R. 763-
64) . 
Sandy Fire Marshal Dave Meldrum was called to the scene 
to investigate the cause and the origin of the February 11, 
1995 fire. (R. 407-08) . According to Robert Basta, Meldrum 
indicated in that conversation that the fire had started in 
the stairwell closet and spread to the basement family room. 
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(R. 777). At trial, Meldrum denied that he made that 
statement. (R. 556). Meldrum, however, indicated in a 
Uniform Fire Investigation Report (UFIR) that. the fire was 
a "rekindle" of the February 10, 1995 fire and identified 
the area or origin as the stairwell closet. (R. 342,347-49, 
588). Also, that he was aware that the electrical wiring was 
one of the possible causes of the fire (R. 415). The one-
page UFIR report was the only written report prepared by the 
Fire Marshal. (R. 342, 591). According to trial testimony, 
Meldrum removed the electrical wiring from the common wall 
separating the closet and family room. (R. 440, 581, 595). 
Meldrum claimed he examined the wiring and left it on a 
trash can in the basement. (R. 444). Brent Basta testified 
on February 11, 1995, he saw two firemen remove the 
electrical wiring from the house and place it on a fire 
truck. According to Brent Basta, one of the firemen was 
Dave Meldrum. (R. 809). Meldrum denied removing the wire 
from the house. (R. 956) . 
At trial Meldrum testified that the fire was 
intentionally set. (R. 416, 418, 422, 424). Meldrum claimed 
to have eliminated all accidental sources for the fire. (R. 
414). Meldrum testified at trial, however, that there was 
in fact damage to the wiring found in the common wall. (R. 
441, 444-48). Photographs taken of the wiring revealed 
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signs of arcing and beading, indicating that the wire had 
shorted at some point. (R. 444-48). Meldrum testified that 
the wire was damaged by the fire and was not the cause of 
the fire. (R. 440-41) . 
Meldrum claimed to have reached this conclusion through 
gross physical examination of the wire alone. Meldrum 
claimed that the lack of brittleness and discoloration as 
well as the overall pliability of the wire indicated that 
the wire did not cause the fire. (R. 416, 441-48) . 
Meldrum claimed that the wiring was "unimportant" and 
was not evidence. (R. 441-44). However, 15 of the 36 
photographs taken of the fire scene by Meldrum were pictures 
of wiring. (R. 440-450). The conditions relied on by 
Meldrum, i.e., brittleness, discoloration and pliability, 
were not discernable from the photographs. (R. 441, 959). 
Meldrum did not prepare a single written report with respect 
to the condition of the wire. Meldrum likewise did not 
take a single photograph of the breaker panel. (R. 427-450). 
Although Meldrum indicated that he left the wire at the 
fire scene, the wire was clearly not present when insurance 
company fire investigators examined the scene. (R. 671-73). 
Donald Peak of Phoenix Investigators examined the scene 
immediately following the fire. (R. 647). Jerry Thompson, a 
personal friend of Meldrum, examined the fire scene in the 
11 
days following the fire. Both men had conversations with 
Meldrum. (R. 647-48, 865). Neither man was told of the fact 
that the wiring had been removed and placed on the garbage 
can despite Meldrum's testimony that he told Peak where the 
wiring was. (R. 649, 696, 863-64). 
Peak indicated in notes prepared contemporaneously with 
his fire scene examination that the fire started "on or near 
the west wall just inside the doorway." (R. 699-702). This 
area of origin is the exact location of the wiring removed 
by Meldrum. Peak also noted in his investigation log dated 
February 19, 1995, that there needed to be an inspection of 
the electrical boxes and wiring removed by Meldrum. (R. 
735). That the electrical wiring was one of the possible 
causes of the fire (R. 686). 
Further, David Smith, Certified Fire Investigator (CFI), 
testified of the likely role the wiring played in the 
ignition of the fire. Smith testified that the cause of the 
fire was accidental and was started by either unextinguished 
embers of the fire of February 10, 1995, or shorts in the 
wiring. (R. 911). Smith testified that gross physical 
examination of the wire was insufficient to eliminate the 
wiring as a source of the fire. (R. 916). Smith also 
testified that the photographs taken for the scene by 
Meldrum and others clearly indicated the role of the wiring 
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in the causation of the fire. (R. 912-17) . Charring depicted 
in the photograph of the 2" x 4" stud wall was heaviest in 
the exact location of the electrical wiring and service 
boxes. 
Following the fire and fire scene investigation, the 
home at 916 East Peachblossom Drive was gutted and 
remodeled. (R. 220-37, 1063). Demolition crew demolished 
the basement of the house on April 4, 5, 6, 7, and 19 of 
1995. This work materially altered the fire scene. Mrs. 
Basta was charged on April 6, 1995. (R. 6, 464). By the 
time she was appointed counsel on April 11, 1995, the 
demolition work on the home was complete. (R. 220-27, 1063). 
Moreover, not only had the home been demolished, the 
majority of the basement had been reframed, rewired and 
remodeled. (R. 218-227) . 
At trial, the State cross-examined Mrs. Basta's expert, 
David Smith, CFI, regarding his on-the-scene fire 
examination. (R. 920). Smith testified that he had not 
examined the scene of the fire, a factual impossibility. (R. 
922). The State argued that his testimony was not credible 
because he had not conducted an on-the-scene fire 
investigation. (R. 1035) . 
Defense counsel entered his appearance and filed a 
Request for discovery pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure, wherein defendant specifically requested 
exculpatory information, witness lists and any plea bargain 
agreements provided to any witnesses as provided in 
discovery rules. 
On April 28, 1995, Dave Meldrum was arrested on 
allegation of theft of a trailer. (R. 467, 192). When 
questioned by police about the offense Meldrum lied and 
produced a forged receipt of sale for the trailer. Meldrum 
was thereafter charged with Theft of a Trailer, a third 
degree felony, by the Salt Lake District Attorney's office. 
(R. 192). Meldrum was not charged with tampering with 
evidence, a second degree felony, nor with providing false 
information to a police officer. The Prosecutor at no time 
notified defense counsel of Meldrum's arrest or of the fact 
that charges had been filed. (R. 185). 
On July 20, 1995, Meldrum appeared with counsel Robert 
Pusey before Honorable Roger A. Livingston on charges of 
Theft of a Trailer. (R. 192). At that time, Meldrum, 
pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the State of Utah, 
entered a plea of "No Contest" to an amended charge of 
Attempted Theft of a Trailer, a class A misdemeanor. 
Meldrum's plea of "No Contest" was then held in abeyance by 
the court for a period of one year. Pursuant to the terms 
of the agreement between the parties the court would dismiss 
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Meldrum's case after one year of "good behavior" which 
included no further violations of the law and payment of 
$150.00 in court costs. (See Addendum "B") The Prosecutor at 
no time informed the defense of Meldrum's charges, the plea 
bargain or of the fact that the plea was held in abeyance in 
exchange for his cooperation. 
At the time of trial Meldrum was cross-examined as to 
the relationship between the plea bargain and his testimony 
as an expert witness for the State. (R. 466-78). Meldrum 
testified that there was absolutely no relationship between 
the two; that his testimony against Mrs. Basta had nothing 
to do with the plea bargain offered him by the prosecution. 
(R. Id.). Meldrum testified that he was "offended" at the 
mere suggestion of a deal in exchange for his testimony. 
(R.473) . 
In closing argument counsel for Mrs. Basta attacked 
Meldrum's credibility and argued that because of his plea 
bargain, Meldrum was biased. (R. 1001-03) The prosecution 
rebutted arguing that there was no deal with Meldrum. 
Further, the prosecution stated that the fact that Meldrum 
came to court and testified in the absence of a deal and 
despite of his dismissal as Sandy Fire Marshal spoke to the 
"the character of the man." (R. 1034). 
Following trial, defense counsel subpoenaed the tape of 
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Dave Meldrum's criminal plea before Judge Livingston. (R. 
1075-76). The transcript of that plea clearly indicates 
that Meldrum was given his plea bargain because he was a 
witness for the State in ongoing Arson prosecutions: 
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor. 
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a 
theft case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple 
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum, 
regardless of his prior position, is still involved in 
several felony investigations, cases that are pending 
and our plan at this point is to continue to prosecute 
those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's cooperation. 
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That 
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being 
a witness? 
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him 
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be 
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is 
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would 
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to 
be collaterally established in similar fashion to what 
happens here today. 
(See Addendum "C"). 
At argument on Mrs. Basta's Motion to Arrest Judgment 
and/or Motion for a New Trial, the prosecutor, Mr. Ernest 
Jones, stated that he was aware that Meldrum had been 
charged and that he had been offered a deal. (R. 1080). 
Jones indicated that at no time was defense counsel advised 
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of that information. (R. 1082-83). The trial court 
nonetheless denied Mrs. Basta's motions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On Appeal, Mrs. Basta, first contends that the 
Prosecutions failure to disclose exculpatory information, 
introducing false/perjured testimony and inappropriate 
argument during closing violated Mrs. Basta's constitutional 
rights and requires a new trial. 
Secondly, Mrs. Basta alleges that she was unfairly 
prejudice in her defense. The prejudiced stems from 
defense's inability to conduct an on-the-scene investigation 
of the fire and then suffering an unfair attack of her 
expert based on his inability to conduct an on-the-scene 
investigation. 
Lastly, the cumulative errors occurring at trial 
prevented Mrs. Basta from receiving a fair trial. 
POINT I. 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY INFORMATION, 
INTRODUCING FALSE/PERJURED TESTIMONY AND 
INAPPROPRIATE ARGUMENT VIOLATED MRS. BASTA'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL. 
Mrs. Basta contends that her rights to a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
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Constitution and her rights to Due Process of Law as 
guaranteed by Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States 
Constitution were violated when the State failed to disclose 
to her exculpatory information prior to trial. Mrs. Basta's 
rights were further violated when the State introduced and 
relied on perjured testimony at trial in Mrs. Basta's case. 
Mrs. Basta was charged by way of Information with the 
offense of Aggravated Arson on April 6, 1995. The Criminal 
Information listed Sandy City Fire Marshal, Dave Meldrum, 
among others, as a witness in the case. Following her 
initial appearance before the magistrate, Mrs. Basta was 
appointed a Public Defender. On April 11, 1995, Mark R. 
Moffat entered his appearance and filed a request for 
discovery pursuant to Rule 16 Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure wherein defendant specifically requested the 
following: 
1. Any evidence which tends to negate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant or mitigate the degree of offense, which 
has been discovered by any member of the agencies 
involved in the investigation or prosecution of 
the above-entitled victim. 
7. A list of all the witnesses that the State 
intends to call for trial in the above-entitled 
matter. 
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10. Any offers of leniency or plea bargain 
agreements or other forms of remuneration provided 
to any of the witnesses listed in number (2) and 
(3)above. 
(R. 14-16) . 
On April 28, 1995, Dave Meldrum was arrested on 
allegation of Theft of a Trailer. When questioned by police 
about the offense Meldrum lied and produced a forged receipt 
of sale for the trailer. Meldrum was thereafter charged 
with Theft of a Trailer, a third degree felony, by the Salt 
Lake District Attorney's office. Meldrum was not charged 
with Tampering with Evidence, a second degree felony, nor 
was he charged with Providing False Information to a Police 
Officer. The State at no time notified defense counsel of 
Meldrum's arrest or of the fact that charges had been filed 
against him. 
On July 20, 1995, Meldrum appeared with counsel before 
the Honorable Roger A. Livingston on charges of Theft of a 
Trailer. At that time, Meldrum entered a plea of "No 
Contest" to the amended charges of Attempted Theft of a 
Trailer, a class A misdemeanor. Meldrum's plea of "No 
Contest" was held in abeyance by the court for a period of 
one year. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between 
the parties the court would dismiss Meldrum's case on one 
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year of "Good Behavior", which included no further 
violations of the law and payment of $150.00 in court costs. 
(See Addendum "B"). The Prosecutor at no time informed the 
defense of Meldrum' s plea or of the fact that the plea was 
held in abeyance. 
At the time of trial Meldrum was cross-examined as to 
the relationship between the plea bargain and his testimony 
as an expert witness for the State. Meldrum testified that 
there was absolutely no relationship between the two; that 
his testimony against Mrs. Basta had nothing to do with the 
plea bargain offered him by the Prosecution. Meldrum 
testified that he was "offended" at the mere suggestion of a 
deal in exchange for his testimony. 
Q. Your plea has been held in abeyance for a year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The plea can be dismissed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are to cooperate with the State as part of 
your plea to make sure the charges are dismissed? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. It's not true? 
A. Absolutely not true. 
(R. 477 ) 
In closing argument counsel for Mrs. Basta attacked 
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Meldrum's credibility and argued that because of his plea 
bargain, Meldrum was biased, his testimony tainted. The 
prosecutor rebutted arguing that there was no deal with 
Meldrum. Further, the prosecution stated that the fact that 
Meldrum came to court and testified in the absence of a deal 
and despite of his dismissal as Sandy Fire Marshal spoke to 
the "the character of the man" Specifically, the prosecutor 
argued: 
"Next", the defense said, "well, the reason you can't 
believe Mr. Meldrum is he's got an interest in the 
outcome of the case." He does? Did he get $2,000.00 
to come in and testify like Mr. Smith? I mean, here's 
a man who's no longer in the Fire Department. He 
could have just said, hey, forget it, forget, it, I'm 
no longer there, I don't really care, but the fact 
that Dave Meldrum comes in here and testifies and 
tells you the same thing that he concluded back in 
February says something about his integrity. It says 
something about the man." (R. 1034). 
Unfortunately, what the prosecutor said to the Jury about 
Meldrum was completely false, as Mr. Meldrum and the 
prosecutor both knew. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Basta was convicted of Aggravated 
Arson and Insurance Fraud. 
Following trial, defense counsel subpoenaed the tape of 
Dave Meldrum's criminal plea before Judge Livingston. The 
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transcript of that plea clearly indicates that Meldrum was 
given his plea bargain because he was a witness for the 
State in ongoing arson prosecutions: 
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor. 
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a 
theft case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple 
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum, 
regardless of his prior position, is still involved in 
several felony investigations, cases that are pending 
and our plan at this point is to continue to prosecute 
those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's cooperation. 
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That 
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being 
a witness? 
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him 
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be 
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is 
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would 
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to 
be collaterally established in similar fashion to what 
happens here today. (See Addendum "C"). 
A. DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS 
The State of Utah violated Mrs. Basta's right to Due 
Process of Law as guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution when it failed to disclose the arrest, 
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plea and the existence of its plea arrangements with 
Meldrum. The State had a duty to disclose the plea bargain 
and the terms of the plea to the defense prior to trial in 
this case. 
In a criminal case, the prosecution is required to 
provide to an accused, upon request, the following 
materials: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-
defendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which one court 
determines on good cause shown should e made available to 
the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(attached hereto as Addendum " D " ) . 
Once an accused requests any of the items in subparts 
(1), (2), (3) and (5), the prosecution must either produce 
the requested material or must identify explicitly those 
portions of the request to which no responsive material will 
be provided. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 
1987). 
The prosecution's duty to produce information extends to 
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other members of the prosecution team. Id. at 918. Once an 
accused has requested production of discovery materials, the 
prosecution must either produce the requested material or 
identify the material not being provided. Id. at 917. 
Failure to comply with discovery requests may violate an 
accused's due process right. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 
(Utah 1993); Knight, 734 P.2d at 921. See, e.g. State v. 
Jarrel, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980) (failure to inform the 
defense of exculpatory or other relevant evidence may result 
in violation of due process). 
The prosecution always has a duty to provide subpart (4) 
material, exculpatory evidence, even if the accused has not 
requested the material. Hay, 859 P.2d at 7 (Utah 1993); 
Utah R. Pro. Responsibility 3.8(d)(Rules of ethics require 
prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends 
to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense".) 
Once an appropriate discovery request is made, the 
prosecution has the duty to preserve and produce the 
requested discovery. Moreover, under Knight the State's 
duty to disclose requested discovery and exculpatory "Brady" 
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material is ongoing. 
Mrs. Basta made a specific request for information 
pertaining to offers of leniency to witnesses the State 
intended to use at trial. The State failed to specifically 
indicate that it was refusing to respond to that request and 
in fact, never did respond. Further, information about 
Meldrum's plea agreement was "Brady" information that should 
have been provided even in the absence of formal request for 
discovery. Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory 
evidence falls within the Brady rule. 
Mrs. Basta's rights to a fair trial and to due process 
of law were violated when the State failed to disclose the 
deal it had given Meldrum. Meldrum was a key prosecution 
witness. His credibility was central to the State's case. 
Meldrum was the first trained investigator on the scene and 
the only witness to have inspected the wiring in the common 
wall or the condition of the breaker panel. See Point II, 
infra. Meldrum's trial testimony was that the condition of 
that wiring and the condition of the breaker panel showed 
this fire as non-accidental. 
Information pertaining to Meldrum's credibility was 
material to the issue of guilt or innocence. The State's 
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suppression of information bearing on Meldrum's credibility 
warrants a new trial irrespective of the prosecutions good 
faith or bad faith. See, Giglio v. United States, 31 L.Ed. 
2d 104 (1972), United States v. Bagley, 87 L.Ed. 2d (1985). 
B. FALSE/PERJURED TESTIMONY 
In violation of Mrs. Basta's rights was compounded by 
the fact that Meldrum lied on the stand with respect to his 
plea agreement with the State. Meldrum testified that he 
had no deal with the State and that his testimony at trial 
against Mrs. Basta had nothing to do with the deal he 
received on his own criminal case. The colloquy referred to 
from Meldrum's criminal proceedings of July 20, 1995, 
clearly indicates otherwise. 
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: it's mine your honor. 
Judge Q: Why are we entering a no contest on a 
theft case? 
Mr. D'Alesandro: Well, there's actually a couple 
of reasons. Chief among them is that Mr.. Meldrum, 
regardless of his prior position, is still involved 
in several felony investigations, cases that are 
pending and our plan at this point is to continue to 
prosecute those cases and with Mr.. Meldrum's 
cooperation. 
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony.. That 
misdemeanor plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being 
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a witness? 
A: No, but I think ah.. It wouldn't disable him 
but with a no contest plea it would less likely be 
used for impeachment purposes. I guess the thought is 
your honor, is that he's an expert witness and would 
be subject to impeachment and no contest will have to 
be collaterally established in similar fashion to 
what happens here today. 
(R. 194-95 Addendum "C" ). The State of Utah clearly 
indicated that they intended to use Meldrum in other cases 
and offered the plea bargain in an effort to secure his 
cooperation and to prevent him from being impeached. 
Meldrum's statements about the relationship between his 
plea bargain and his testimony are patently false. The 
magnitude of the constitutional violation is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the Prosecutor reiterated and 
argued Meldrum's false testimony in his closing argument. 
Specifically, the prosecutor attempted to bolster 
Meldrum's credibility by arguing that Meldrum's deal had 
nothing to do with his testimony against Mrs. Basta. The 
Prosecutor went on to argue that the mere fact Meldrum 
showed up to testify absent a deal and having lost his job 
as Fire Marshal spoke, "to the character of the man". 
A new trial is required if "false testimony could.. In 
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any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury". Naupe v. Illinois, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1217 (1959) (citing 
Giglio v. United States, 31 L.Ed. 2d at 108). Given 
Meldrum's importance to the case, false testimony respecting 
his own criminal prosecution clearly could have affected the 
judgment of the jury. False testimony about items relating 
to his credibility as well as argument by the prosecution 
bolstered Meldrum's credibility in the eyes of the jury. 
The plea bargain offer extended for Meldrum and the 
reason for that offer were issues directly related to the 
credibility of his testimony. The jury had a right to know 
those facts including the reasons for the deal. More 
importantly, Mrs. Basta had the right to be informed so that 
her counsel could conduct proper and full cross-examination, 
including critical impeachment examination. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Basta requests this Court grant her a 
new trial. 
C. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
A prosecuting attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
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d e f i n i t e sense the se rvant of the law; the twofold 
aim of which i s t h a t g u i l t s h a l l not escape or 
innocence s u f f e r . He may p rosecu te with ea rnes tnes s 
and v igor—indeed , he should do so . But, while he may 
s t r i k e hard blows, he i s not a t l i b e r t y t o s t r i k e 
foul ones . I t i s as much h i s duty t o r e f r a i n from 
improper methods c a l c u l a t e d t o produce a wrongful 
conv ic t ion as i t i s t o use every l e g i t i m a t e means t o 
b r ing about a j u s t one. 
S t a t e v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992)(quot ing 
Berger v. United S t a t e s , 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) . The 
p rosecu to r v i o l a t e d t he se important maxims and knowingly 
in t roduced , defended and argued f a l s e / p e r j u r e d tes t imony in 
v i o l a t i o n of c o n t r o l l i n g e t h i c a l gu ide l i ne s 1 and fundamental 
f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e d by our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r i c t u r e s . 
Genera l ly , t he t e s t used for determining whether a 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t ements a re improper and c o n s t i t u t e e r r o r i s 
whether the remarks " ' c a l l e d t o the j u r o r s ' a t t e n t i o n 
ma t t e r s which they would not be j u s t i f i e d in cons ide r ing in 
reaching a v e r d i c t . ' " S t a t e v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 
(Utah 1992) (quoting S t a t e v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 
1983) (quoting S t a t e v. Crev is ton , 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 
1
 I n t h e Utah Rules of P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct Rule 3 . 5 ( e ) i t 
s t a t e s "A lawyer s h a l l n o t i n t r i a l , a l l u d e t o any m a t t e r t h a t t h e 
l awyer does n o t r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e i s r e l e v a n t or t h a t w i l l no t be 
s u p p o r t e d by a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e , a s s e r t p e r s o n a l knowledge of f a c t s i n 
i s s u e e x c e p t when t e s t i f y i n g as a w i t n e s s , or s t a t e a p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n 
as t o t h e j u s t n e s s of a c a u s e , t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s , t h e 
c u l p a b i l i t y of a c i v i l l i t i g a n t or t h e g u i l t or i nnocence of an 
a c c u s e d . " 
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1982))) (footnote omitted). 
The rules governing reversal in prosecution misconduct 
cases are found in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), 
which explains remarks of counsel may not (1) bring in 
matters which should not be considered by the jury in 
rendering a verdict, and (2) the inappropriate remarks or 
behavior under the circumstances of the case may not 
inappropriately influence the jurors in their verdict. 
Analyzing this case reveals that the prosecutor brought 
in matters the jury was not entitled to hear by manipulating 
the testimony they did hear. The proseucotr kept from the 
defense the accurate information and truth about Meldrum's 
criminal history and plea bargain. He crossed that line 
again when he permitted the false/perjured testimony of 
Meldrum blatantly denying the truth of the plea bargain. 
Perhaps most egregious of the prosecutor's behavior is then 
knowingly arguing to the jury how credible and truthful 
Meldrum was as a witness. Our Supreme Court has stated, 
"The State's obligation is to assure that justice is done. 
That obligation does not include or authorize over-reaching, 
exaggeration, or any form of personalizing by the prosecutor 
in the deliberation process." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
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546, 557 (Utah 1987) . 
Two additional Utah Supreme Court cases elucidate the 
issues in this sub-point: 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility 
of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion 
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two 
dangers: [1] such comments can convey the 
impression that evidence not presented to the 
jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the 
charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried 
solely on the basis of the evidence presented to 
the jury; and [2] the prosecutor's opinion 
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government 
and may induce the jury to trust the Government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence. 
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). 
A determination of step two for finding impermissible 
prosecutor conduct depends mainly upon how strong the 
evidence is leading to the defendant's guilt. Our high 
court has explained that for prosecutor's misconduct to 
require reversal requires a conclusion that the 
inappropriate information acquired by the jury in step one 
results in undermining the confidence in the verdict, i.e., 
did the jury likely use that information to return their 
verdict. In part this analysis depends on the case. 
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In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), the 
Court reaffirmed its displeasure with prosecutors who would 
"call attention to matters outside the evidence." The 
Court reversed the conviction in Troy stating, " The error 
was then adduced as harmful requiring reversal because of 
the conflicting evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations. The greater the conflict in the evidence 
of defendant's guilt, the more susceptible the jury will be 
to utilize the improper information from the prosecutor to 
tilt the scales inappropriately toward guilt warranting a 
reversal of that conviction by the appellate court. Id. 
Because Meldrum was such a critical witness for the 
State (see also Point II, infra) , this Court must conclude 
that the untruthful testimony received from Meldrum and then 
bolstered by the prosecutor who improperly vouched for his 
credibility inarguably impacted on the jurors' verdict. A 
reading of the transcripts reveals a case where expert 
testimony resolved the decision for the jury. 
The evidence presented by the State to support the 
elements of Arson without the expert testimony is 
inconclusive and/or too inherently improbable that it could 
have supported a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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The State was unable to present any evidence to explain the 
extremely large area of origin identified by its experts. 
The only possibility that could explain the area of origin 
involved the use of an accelerant. However, no accelerant 
was found at the scene. In addition, Mrs. Basta was last in 
the family room by all accounts at 9:00 a.m. Brent Basta 
left the basement and walked past the family room at 9:10 
a.m. If Mrs. Basta had ignited the fire at 9:00 a.m. by 
igniting "common combustibles", the fire and common 
combustibles would have been burning a full 10 minutes 
before Brent Basta left the basement. Given the type of 
material that was stored in the basement (i.e. cardboard, 
paper, wood, candles) the fire would have been raging in 10 
minutes time. Given that Brent Basta neither saw fire nor 
was injured, such a scenario is so inherently improbable 
that it could not independently support a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 
981 Utah (1993) . 
Expert testimony likely resolved the conflict. The 
prosecutor's conduct regarding his expressed view of his 
expert Meldrum and Meldrum's testimony impermissibly and 
inappropriately tilted the balance against a fair trial as 
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guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the convictions 
entered against Mrs. Basta and remand this matter for a new 
trial. 
POINT II. 
FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE FIRE SCENE DESTRUCTION,OF 
MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND UNFAIRLY ATTACKING MRS BASTA' S 
EXPERT WITNESS VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL. 
Sandy Fire Marshall Meldrum in the course of this 
investigation removed critical electrical wiring from 
the crime scene which then disappeared under 
conflicting testimony. Likewise, the status of the 
initial view of the breaker panel box was not 
preserved. Because the removed wiring and breaker 
panel condition were material to the issue of Mrs. 
Basta's guilt or innocence, the State and its 
investigators had a duty to preserve those items of 
evidence. The failure to preserve that evidence denied 
Mrs. Basta's rights to due process of law and her 
rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by both the state 
and federal constitutions. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the-issue of 
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destroyed evidence on the case of State v. Nebekerr 657 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1983) . Nebeker involved the 
destruction of photograph arrays used by investigative 
officers in efforts to identify the perpetrator. The 
photograph arrays were apparently shown to the victim 
prior to the time of a line-up wherein the defendant 
was identified. Testimony produced at trial indicated 
that the defendant's picture was not included in the 
photograph arrays. Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1361-63. 
Defendant was convicted at trial and thereafter 
appealed claiming that his rights to due process were 
fundamentally violated by the destruction of the 
photograph arrays. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction stating: 
Fundamental to either duty [the duty to 
preserve evidence or the duty to disclose it] 
is the prerequisite that the evidence 
destroyed, disposed of, or suppressed by the 
prosecution was material in the 
constitutional sense. 
Id. at 1363 (citing State v. Hudspeth, 593 P.2d 548 
(Utah 1978)). 
Constitutional materiality was defined by the 
Court as evidence "vital to the issue of whether or not 
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the defendant was guilty of the charge" and whether 
there is a fundamental unfairness that requires the 
Court to set aside the defendant's conviction. Id. 
(citing State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975)). 
The Court went on to comment: 
The mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed evidence might have helped 
defense, or might have affected the outcome 
of trial, does not establish "materiality" in 
the constitutional sense. 
Id. at 1365. The earlier Stewart Court on the same 
point had commented: "We think it advisable that those 
charged with investigation and prosecution of crime 
retain intact all records and other evidence pertaining 
to the case until it is finally disposed of. By 
adopting such a practice, a claim of unfairness by one 
charged with a criminal offense would be groundless." 
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975). 
Preservation of electrical wiring from a fire 
scene would surely work no hardship on the 
investigators. As suggested by the Stewart Court, in 
an Arson case little else could be suspected to be 
preserved in order to avoid later challenges from an 
accused. 
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A second case addressing destruction of evidence 
and due process violations is State v. Jimenez, 761 
P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1988). Jimenez involved a 
defendant charged with assault on a peace officer. A 
video tape which may have recorded the incident was 
routinely erased by jail personnel. Following 
preliminary hearing, the defense moved to dismiss the 
charges based on a violation of due process stemming 
from the destruction. Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's 
motion. The State then appealed, id. at 577-78. The 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal, 
noting that there had been no proof that a video tape 
had been created that depicted the alleged assault. 
Absent such proof, the defendant had failed to 
establish evidence existed and then was destroyed. 
In reaching its holding in Jimenez, the Court of 
Appeals cited to the case of People v. Harms, 560 P.2d 
470 (Colo. App. 1976). Harms similarly had involved 
the destruction of a video tape depicting an 
altercation between defendant and police officers. 
Unlike Jimenez, however, the existence of the tape was 
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established as was its importance to the guilt or 
innocence of Harms. Id. at 472-73. The court ruled 
that defendant's due process rights were violated by 
the destruction of the video tape and reversed its 
conviction Id. at 474. In so holding the Colorado 
Court of Appeals stated: 
The duty to preserve evidence known to be 
material is part of the duty to disclose. 
The principle underlying this rule is the 
constitutional requirement that a criminal 
defendant be afforded due process. The focus 
therefore is not upon the existence or extent 
of any culpability by the authorities in 
failing to preserve clearly material 
evidence, a matter not generally susceptible 
of proof by defendant. Rather, it is directed 
at the effect that the loss of the particular 
item of evidence has on defendant's ability 
to defend against the criminal charges. 
Id. at 472 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
The court went on to state: 
The destruction of the video tape through 
official misfeasance has effectively 
precluded defendant from ever demonstrating 
whether it supported his version of the 
altercation. He was thus denied due process. 
The evidence was destroyed was known to be 
material and critical, and not merely 
incidental to, the question of defendant's 
quilt or innocence, and therefore, the duty 
to preserve the film for its evidentiary 
value was apparent. The significance of the 
eradicated evidence in this case reflects 
disfavorably on the failure to ensure its 
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preservation. 
Id. at 433 (citations omitted). 
The court addressed the materiality of the tape 
stating: 
The materiality of the destroyed video tape 
cannot be questioned. Had it been preserved, 
it likely would have conclusively established 
defendant's innocence or guilt. 
Where, as here, crucial material evidence is 
wholly destroyed by the prosecution, and the 
responsibility for such destruction cannot 
properly be imputed to the defense, any 
requirement that defendant somehow 
demonstrate that the evidence was exculpatory 
becomes an absurdity, and is not imposed. 
Id. at 474 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed observing, 
"whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the states 
to preserve the evidence, that duty must be limited to 
evidence that might be expected to play a significant 
role in the suspect's defense." Salt Lake v. Emerson, 
861 P.2d 443 (Utah 1993) (citing California v. 
Tromobeta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984))(emphasis added). 
Mr. Meldrum admitted that he was aware that the 
electrical wiring was one of the possible causes of the 
fire. Donald Peak agreed. Accordingly, it was 
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foreseeable that such evidence would play a 
"significant part in the suspect's defense." Cf. 
Emerson, 861 P.2d at 448. 
The Utah high court went on to state, "evidence 
must both possess an exculpatory value that was 
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of 
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to 
obtain comparable evidence by any other reasonably 
available means." id. at 489. 
Not only was the evidence destroyed, the 
photographs that were taken made it impossible to 
assess the brittleness versus pliability" that Mr. 
Meldrum stated would determine if the wiring had caused 
the fire. 
As the situation in this case, it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to show the importance of 
missing evidence that the defense has not had the 
opportunity to examine. This near impossibility is due 
to the fact that the brittleness versus the pliability 
that Mr. Meldrum examined for could not be 
independently determined by simply looking at a 
photograph, as was so effectively argued by the State 
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in closing. 
The wire removed by Dave Meldrum was clearly 
material to the issue of Mrs. Basta's guilt or 
innocence. The possibility that the wire had caused 
the fire had to have been excluded by Meldrum beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proximity to the State's claimed 
area of origin, the fact that it was removed from the 
wall and photographed repeatedly, the log and note 
entries of Donald Peak and the char patterns depicted 
in photographs, all point to the importance of the 
wire. 
There is more than a "mere possibility" that the 
wire might have helped the defense. David Smith 
testified of the role the wire played in the ignition 
of the fire. The physical evidence and burn patterns 
support its role in the fire. Donald Peak's notes and 
log entries indicate his concerns regarding the wire. 
Clearly the wire was material and should have been 
preserved. 
Neither the jury nor this Court can rely on 
Meldrum's claims that the wire was "unimportant" and 
"not evidence" in the constitutionally material sense. 
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An assertion by the very agency responsible 
for the negligent or otherwise destruction of 
evidence regarding its alleged content. . .is 
insufficient to cure the damage resulting 
from the defendant having been deprived of 
its use in the preparation of his defense. 
People v. Harmsf 560 P.2d at 575. 
In this case, the assertion is further weakened, 
due in light of the fact that the person making the 
assertion, is the only person that examined the 
evidence. The person's credibility is also in question 
due to a cooperative agreement the witness had with the 
State and his own perjury. See Point I, supra. 
Constitutional materiality also looks to whether 
there is a "fundamental unfairness that requires the 
court to set aside the defendant's conviction." State 
v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359 (1983). 
In this case, not only was the actual evidence 
destroyed, but the State aggressively argued that the 
defense expert's testimony should be disregarded 
because he had the hubris to rely on the only evidence 
that was preserved by the State, the photographs. The 
prosecutor stated in closing: 
Well, finally we heard from the defense 
expert, and there are a couple of things that 
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I think are troubling about David Smith's 
testimony. Oh, great credentials for this 
man who claims that he investigated more than 
6,000 fires. He is paid $2,000.00 to come in 
here and testify for the defense. He only 
relies on what somebody else has already done 
to do his investigation. . . In fact, I put 
Dave Meldrum back on the stand and I said, 
"Have you ever heard such a thing that 
somebody can reach a conclusion as to cause 
and origin simply by looking at somebody 
else's photographs?" 
Boy wouldn't that be nice? I wish I could 
solve all crimes by looking at somebody 
else's photographs. 
Mr. Meldrum replied,"No, I've never heard of 
that being done." 
(R. 1063-65) . For the State to so aggressively 
impeach an expert because he was unable to examine 
evidence that the State failed to preserve is 
fundamentally unfair and under the Nebeker analysis 
requires a new trial. 
Moreover, in failing to preserve the wire as 
evidence; and in failing to prepare a single note or 
report about the wire and condition of the wall; and in 
failing to prepare a single photograph, note, or report 
of the condition of the breaker panel; the State of 
Utah, both investigators and prosecution, violated Mrs. 
43 
Basta's rights to due process of law and her rights to 
a fair trial. The magnitude of the constitutional 
violation provides the Court with good cause why the 
convictions in this case should be reversed. 
POINT III. 
THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS OCCURRING AT TRIAL PREVENTED 
MRS. BASTA FROM RECEIVING HER GUARANTEED FAIR TRIAL. 
The combination of these errors identified in Points I 
and II warrant overturning the jury's verdict. This is an 
inappropriate case to find harmless error. The doctrine of 
harmless error applies to "errors which, although properly 
preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957-58 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 
(Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For an error 
to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
In determining whether reversal is warranted, several 
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factors are considered, including "the importance of the 
witness' [s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness 
on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 
(Utah 1987). 
Arguably, the most important testimony introduced by the 
State against Mrs. Basta was that of Mr. Meldrum. In a fair 
trial, the defendant's constitutional rights to due process 
guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions would be 
preserved by a trial unencumbered by the errors complained of 
herein. Both the issue of the discovery violation where the 
State failed to provide the information of Meldrum's criminal 
conviction and Meldrum's perjurious testimony coupled with 
the inappropriate prosecutorial behavior arguing Meldrum's 
untruthful testimony to the jury and emphasizing that 
testimony excessively balances heavily against a jury 
decision free from those biases. 
To the extent this Court would not reverse the jury 
verdict based on each error independently, an examination of 
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the impact of these errors collectively on the fair trial 
request, requires relief for Mrs. Basta. 
Indeed, the likelihood of a different outcome without the 
cumulative errors complained of herein is sufficiently high 
in this case rendering the errors harmful, not harmless, and 
warrant disturbing the jury verdict. The Court therefore, 
should grant Mrs. Basta a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors complained of herein undermine one's 
confidence in the verdict. Mrs. Basta was unable to receive 
a fair trial as a result of being denied important 
constitutionally based rights. For these reasons, Mrs. 
Basta's convictions must be overturned a n O ) new trial 
ordered. 
VRIG^MD G. UDAY 
Attorney for Mrs. Basta/ 
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ADDENDUM "A 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of 
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a 
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-6-103; 1986, ch. 59, § 2. 
76-6-102. Arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not 
amounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire or 
explosives, the person unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
(a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) the property of another. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree 
felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is: 
(a) a second degree felony if the damage caused is or 
exceeds $5,000 in value; 
(b) a third degree felony if the damage caused is or exceeds 
$1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is or exceeds 
$300 but is less than $1,000 in value; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is less than 
$300. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-6-102; 1986, ch. 59, § 1; 1989, ch. 5, § 1; 1995, ch. 
291, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 
1995, substituted "is or exceeds" for "exceeds" and "less 
than" for "not more than" in Subsections (3)(a) to (c), 
"$300" for "$250" in Subsection (3)(c), "less than $300" for 
"$250 or less" in Subsection (3)(d), and made stylistic 
changes throughout the section. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act - Punishment as 
for theft. 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that 
person with intent to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written 
statement or representation knowing that the statement or 
representation contains false or fraudulent information 
concerning any fact material to an application for the 
issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or 
contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written 
statement or representation as part of or in support of a 
claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance 
policy, certificate, or contract, or in connection with any 
civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for personal or 
bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the 
statement or representation contains false or fraudulent 
information concerning any fact or thing material to the 
claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a 
fraudulent insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a 
scheme or artifice to obtain fees for professional services, 
or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsections (1)(b) through (1)(d), is 
punishable as in the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 
for communication fraud for property of like value. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense 
of insurance fraud under the same conditions as those set 
forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsections (1) (b) through (1) (d) shall be measured by the 
total value of all property, money, or other things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act or 
acts described in Subsections (1) (b) through (1) (d) . 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, § 13. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 
1994, rewrote this section to such an extent that a detailed 
analysis is impracticable. 
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ADDENDUM "C 
STATE OF UTAH 
v, 
DAVID MELDRUM 
Mr. Pusey: Your honor, Dave Meldrum. 
Your honor, I believe we have a disposition for Mr. Meldrum as 
well. It is my understanding that the State would be willing to 
move to amend the single count information to a Class A Attempted 
Unlawful Control of a trailer..urn to which Mr. Meldrum would enter 
a plea of No Contest, to be held in Abeyance for a period of one 
year. The proposed terms of the plea would be that he pay $150.00 
in costs and that he be on good behavior with probation to the 
Court. 
Judge: That would be the only terms of the Plea and Abeyance? 
A* That's my understanding, your honor-
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case? 
Mr. Delasandro: It's mine, your honor. 
Q. Why are we entering a No Contest on a theft case? 
Mr. Delasandro: Well, there's actually a couple of reasons. 
Chief among them is that Mr. Meldrum, regardless of his prior 
position, is still involved in several felony investigations, cases 
that are pending and our plan at this point is to continue to 
prosecute those cases and with Mr. Meldrum's cooperation. 
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony. . .that a misdemeanor 
plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being a witness? 
A. No, but I think ah...it wouldn't disable him but with a No 
Contest plea it would less likely be used for impeachment purposes 
0 C C 1 9 4 
I guess the thought is, your honor, is that he's an expert witness 
and would be subject to impeachment and No Contest will have to be 
collaterally established in a similar fashion to what happens here 
today. 
Judge: Well, if the plea is held in abeyance, wouldn't it have 
to be collaterally established anyway? 
A. I think it's the plea that is admissible, and it's admissible 
as to the impeachment as opposed to a (inaudible) . 
Judge: Just an exception to heresy rule? It's a statement 
against interest, I guess, a declaration. Now, you're not 
suggesting however in asking me to take a No Contest plea in 
abeyance, Mr. Pusey, that in fact that the... that the incident did 
not occur which in fact your client did not in fact hook the 
trailer onto his truck and make a post-Miranda admission that he 
took it without permission? 
A. No. We're not making an alford plea, your Honor. 
Judge: O.K. It would be an accurate to state then...that my 
understanding is again both the Plea in Abeyance I suppose could be 
premised upon lack of prior criminal history but the plea in 
Abeyance, at least in part, as well as the No Contest plea is so 
that Mr. Meldrum can in fact be more likely be able to testify as 
an expert witness in any pending cases, is that true? 
A. That's true. 
Court: Is Mr. Meldrum still employed in that same capacity? 
A. He is not, your honor. I don't know his employment status but 
he definitely has been terminated from this. 
Q. How many years? 
0 ft\ ft 1 Q S 
A. 17 years merit position. He's paid a due price for 
(inaudible) mistake he made, your Honor. 
Q: What happens to that 17 out of 20? Can't you just cash that 
out? 
A- Yea. 
Q. Is this like a recreational trailer? 
A. No, utility. 
Judge: With the understanding then the plea will be held in 
abeyance and not entered, Mr. Meldrum, how do you then plead 
to...is it a Class A then? Is it attempted? 
A. Attempted I believe. 
Judge: Attempted Unlawful Control of a motor vehicle, or 
trailer, during the date and at a place set forth in the 
Information, will it be guilty or No Contest? 
A. No Contest, your honor. 
Q. A No Contest plea is received but not entered. I'm going to 
direct the clerk of the Court to hold that No Contest plea in 
Abeyance for one year period of time. The conditions will be #1, 
your good behavior; and #2, the payment of $150.00 court cost 
assessment. If we give you 30 days from today, Mr. Meldrum, is 
that enough time to pay the court cost? 
Meldrum: I'll just do it today. 
Judge: If you'll step to the counter then downstairs and write 
out that check right away to take care of it, that will clear the 
financial part of it. Thank you. 
Atty: Now, a year from now we'll be making appropriate motion 
to the Court to submit a copy to Mr. Delasandro. 
ADDENDUM "D 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material 
or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant 
or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the 
defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as 
required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any 
other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall 
make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as 
soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or 
defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party 
that material and information may be inspected, tested or 
copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time 
order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or 
deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon 
motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written 
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court 
enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte 
showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be 
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made 
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal, 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it 
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has 
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence 
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may 
be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily 
impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the 
crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail 
scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtained 
without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of 
his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance 
at the time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required 
for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time 
and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused 
and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved 
by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be 
grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered 
as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt 
of the accused and shall be subject to such further 
sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
